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ABSTRACT 
We use the existing outputs of the Combat Logistics Force (CLF) Planner tool to: (1) 
assess the minimum level of support required for a specified force in a multi-stage naval 
combat scenario and (2) compare CLF adequacy, surplus mission capability, and logistics 
shortfalls that a minimum level of support provides to combat forces of varying 
compositions.  We examine the potential impact of the transition from a traditional 
nuclear-powered aircraft carrier strike group to a more distributed conventionally-
powered one.  We find that the logistical demands of a small conventionally-powered 
carrier strike group with comparable striking power require significant increases in CLF 
end strength, and therefore that logistical supportability must be an integral part of future 
fleet planning. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Over the past few years, United States maritime strategy has placed increased emphasis 
on forward presence, peace-keeping and cooperative engagement with regional strategic 
partners.  Concerned that the current U.S. naval fleet might not be up to these new tasks, 
the Office of Net Assessment of the Office of the Secretary of Defense commissioned the 
Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) to conduct a study outlining the type of future fleet that 
might best meet the needs of evolving U.S. maritime strategy. 
 The resulting study proposes a compelling argument for a distributed, “bimodal” 
(featuring distinct littoral and open-ocean elements) force that is significantly different 
from the present U.S. fleet.  The logistical supportability of this new fleet, however, is 
left as an open question by the original NPS study.  Because we feel adequate logistical 
support is a necessary condition for operational success, the purpose of this research is to 
help fill that void by performing an initial analysis of the ability of the Combat Logistics 
Force (CLF) as currently comprised to support key elements of this new distributed fleet.  
In order to answer this question, we first look more closely at what the concept of 
“adequate support” entails.  Previous work was focused on simple “go or no-go” analysis 
that is sufficient for answering the fundamental question “is it supportable?”, but falls 
short in providing the additional insight needed to make informed choices between 
potential alternatives such as those encountered when planning support for a hypothetical 
future fleet.  We use an existing mixed integer optimization-based planning tool in a 
manner that promotes analytic flexibility and yields supplemental statistics that provide 
these needed insights.   
To accomplish this, a notional 100-day “war at sea” scenario is developed and 
used to exercise sets of notional combatant task groups drawn from both the existing U.S. 
fleet and the future fleet as proposed by the NPS study.  These notional task groups are 
then run through our planning tool to determine the minimum level of CLF support 
required for mission success.  In addition to traditional “go or no-go” feasibility  
 
 xvi 
assessments, we draw additional rate statistics from the output of the model to serve as 
proxies for potential surplus logistics support capacity and operational mission flexibility 
of the combatant ships assigned. 
We find that the introduction of conventionally powered light aircraft carriers of 
30,000–40,000 tons that forms the cornerstone of the NPS study will create a crippling 
burden for the present-day CLF.  Further, we find that the reduced logistical footprint of 
the smaller escort vessels proposed does not appear to be sufficient to offset the 
additional demands imposed by the conventionally fueled carriers employed.  From this, 
we conclude that the potential deficiencies in the ability of the CLF to support this new 
fleet are too large to justify the “wait and see” approach towards future CLF force 
structure adopted by the original NPS study.  We also assess the pros and cons of the 
study method developed here, finding that the additional flexibility and insights provide 
sufficient justification for the additional analyst workload that this method entails.   
 xvii 
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A. PURPOSE OF THIS RESEARCH 
In response to the challenges of meeting the new maritime strategy laid out in 
A Cooperative Strategy for 21
st
 Century Sea Power (SECNAV, 2007), the Office of Net 
Assessment of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) commissioned the Naval 
Postgraduate School to conduct a study of what sort of force structure might best support 
it.  The resulting report, The New Navy Fighting Machine: A Study of the Connections 
Between Contemporary Policy, Strategy, Sea Power, Naval Operations, and the 
Composition of the United States Fleet (Hughes, 2009), hereafter referred to as the 
NNFM, proposes a radically different force structure from that which we have today.  As 
it provides only archetypes of the types of ships that might be added to most efficiently 
deliver the capabilities required in support the new maritime strategy, the adequacy of the 
existing Combat Logistics Force (CLF) to support the new fleet was left as an open 
question pending further development of the ships proposed.  The purpose of this 
research is to help fill that void by performing an initial analysis of the ability of the CLF 
as currently comprised to support one of the key enablers of the bimodal fleet described 
by the NNFM study—the introduction of smaller, conventionally-powered “light” aircraft 
carriers (CVL) of about 30,000 tons, each carrying one-third as many aircraft as the 
nuclear-powered aircraft carriers (CVN) currently employed. 
Toward this end, we use the outputs of an existing optimization-based CLF 
scheduling and force planning tool (CLF Planner).  The goals of this are two-fold:  (1) 
assess the minimum level of logistical support (in terms of number of CLF ships 
required) for a specified force in a multi-stage scenario, and (2) derive metrics from the 
resulting notional replenishment schedules to assess and compare surplus mission 
capability (both combatant and logistical) that this minimum level of support provides to 
combat forces of varying compositions.  We find that supporting the logistic demands of 
a CVL-based carried strike group with comparable striking power to a current nuclear 
(CVN) based group require significant increases to the CLF end strength, and therefore 
logistical supportability must  be made an integral part of any future fleet planning. 
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B. THE CHANGING FACE OF U.S. NAVAL STRATEGY 
In 2007, the service chiefs of the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard 
issued a new document outlining their vision for the Department of the Navy’s (DoN) 
role in the future of United States military strategy.  Building upon the foundation laid in 
Admiral Vern Clark’s “Sea Power 21” (2002), A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century 
Sea Power (SECNAV, 2007) outlines a transformative view of the role of maritime 
power in the coming years.  The fleet of the future will be “characterized by regionally 
concentrated, forward-deployed task forces with the combat power to limit regional 
conflict, deter major power war, and … win our Nation’s wars as part of a joint or 
combined campaign” as well as providing 
persistent, mission-tailored maritime forces… globally distributed in order 
to contribute to homeland defense-in-depth, foster and sustain cooperative 
relationships with [our] international partners, and prevent of mitigate 
disruptions and crises. (SECNAV, 2007, p. 8) 
Meeting these objectives requires growth in several capabilities.  In addition to 
the well established functions of forward presence and power projection ashore, future 
U.S. maritime forces will increasingly be called on to serve in a deterrent capacity 
through theater ballistic missile defense (TBMD) (SECNAV, 2007, p. 13).  In order to 
ensure our continued control of the seas, U.S. anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities 
must be improved and expanded to counter the proliferation of modern diesel-electric and 
nuclear-powered submarines (SECNAV, 2007, p.13).  The Navy of the future will also 
continue to play an increased role in global maritime security (counter piracy and 
smuggling interdiction) and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) 
operations (SECNAV, 2007, p. 14). 
The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) plan to provide these capabilities is 
outlined in the 2011 long-range ship construction plan (OPNAV N8F, 2010) prepared for 
Congress.  Over the next 30 years, 256 vessels—roughly 90% of the current fleet of 
284—are scheduled to be retired from service (OPNAV N8F, 2010, p. 21).  These are to 
be replaced by 276 new vessels (OPNAV N8F, 2010, p. 18), with “spiral upgrades” and 
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service life extensions for existing platforms serving to fill the projected gaps in numbers 
and capabilities (OPNAV N8F, 2010, p. 9). 
This plan carries risks, of course.  Responsibility for many of the expanded 
mission areas outlined in A Cooperative Strategy for 21
st
 Century Sea Power will fall 
squarely on the shoulders of the cruisers (CG) and destroyers (DDG) that form the 
numerical backbone of the fleet.  Increased requirements for these multi-mission ships to 
provide forward presence and TBMD while still performing their traditional roles in 
strike group operations is expected to provide “additional pressure” on the baseline 
inventory of 88 ships and may require a choice between purchasing additional ships or 
“redistributing assets currently being employed for missions of lesser priority” (OPNAV 
N8F, 2010, p. 14).  Put another way, the Navy foresees that our current fleet of the future 
may not be big enough to meet its commitments. 
C. THE NEW NAVY FIGHTING MACHINE (NNFM) 
Perhaps recognizing the challenges of meeting this new maritime strategy, the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense’s (OSD) Office of Net Assessment commissioned the 
Naval Postgraduate School to conduct a study of what sort of force structure might best 
support it.  The resulting report (Hughes, 2009) proposes a radically different force 
structure from the current fleet.  It proposes a “wider mix of ships, in a more numerous 
fleet, with better-focused capabilities, to meet a range of scenarios in green and blue 
water environments” (Hughes, 2009, p. vii).  Achieving a total of 677 ships within an 
affordable budget, it calls for a reduced emphasis on the expensive multi-mission 
warships of today, replacing some (but not all) with greater quantities of smaller, less 
expensive mission-focused ships, and puts more emphasis on “green water” (littoral or 
coastal) capabilities. 
It is not the intent of this research to assess the potential efficacy of this new 
distributed and bimodal (featuring distinct littoral and open ocean elements) force.  
Nevertheless, we believe there are several reasons why the NNFM alternative is worthy 
of further analysis.  First, having been designed from the ground up to meet the needs of 
A Cooperative Strategy for 21
st
 Century Sea Power as interpreted though the considerable 
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experience of the author and his collegues, it is exceptionally well suited to meeting those 
goals.  By more than doubling the pool of available ships, requirements for additional 
forward presence and persistence of forces are clearly met.  The need for “mission-
tailored maritime forces” is addressed by an emphasis on increased mission 
specialization. 
Second, very little is sacrificed in pursuit of these gains.  A reasonable argument 
can be made that more ships are only better if they are the right ships—that the increased 
specialization that drives smaller ships and lower unit costs brings with it a reduced 
flexibility that simple numerical superiority might not overcome.  While perhaps 
generally true, this is not the case in this instance.  While down sized in tonnage, 
featuring destroyers and frigates (FFG) in place of the current mix of cruisers and 
destroyers, the NNFM plan actually achieves more multi-mission warships than the 
current OPNAV shipbuilding plan—a combined 120 DDG and FFG for the NNFM plan 
(Hughes, 2009, p. 50) as compared to the 88 DDG and CG in the current OPNAV plan 
(OPNAV N8F, 2010, p. 12).  Carrier-based airpower faces a small reduction, with the 
NNFM concept calling for an end-strength of 620–680 aircraft vice the current 700 
(Hughes, 2009, pp. 31–32).  Increased future reliance on unmanned aerial vehicles may 
well render the real impact of this modest reduction moot. 
Lastly, the NNFM plan is economically feasible.  The proposed cost of  
$15 billion per year, though slightly higher than that of the current shipbuilding plan 
(Hughes, 2009, p. 11), is still smaller than the ship construction budget needed to achieve 
the Navy’s proposed 313-ship program as outlined by OPNAV N8F (2010).  In this age 
of tightening budget constraints, having a larger pool of less expensive construction 
projects is itself an asset.  Cuts, when required, can be better tailored to meet specific 
savings goals.  By having more construction “starts” to spread, the industrial base can be 
better preserved as well. 
In summary, although our purpose in not to argue the case for the NNFM concept, 
it provides the capabilities to meet our future needs while maintaining our current core 
competencies.  Moreover, it does so at an essentially equivalent cost to the current plan.  
It is better positioned to thrive with uncertain future budget limitations, and provides 
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flexibility to better support the shipbuilding industrial base when needed.  Additional 
second-order benefits exist, but we feel these reasons alone justify further exploration of 
the NNFM concept.  
D. WHY WORRY ABOUT SUPPORTABILITY AT SEA? 
In his introduction to Worrall Carter’s Beans, Bullets, and Black Oil, Admiral 
Spruance writes:  “A sound logistics plan is the foundation upon which a war operation 
should be based.  If the necessary minimum of logistics support cannot be given to the 
combatant forces involved, the operation may fail, or at best be only partially successful” 
(Carter, 1953).  This fundamental truth, that an “army travels on its stomach” (to quote 
Napoleon) has been understood, if not always heeded, since the time of Alexander the 
Great, if not earlier.  Adequate logistical support is without a doubt a necessary condition 
for the success of any prolonged military campaign. 
Admiral Henry Eccles further highlights that while naval logistics is the sum of 
many parts, the unparalleled “combination of power, flexibility and mobility” sea power 
offers will “remain potential rather than real unless the capabilities of mobile fleet 
support are fully developed and exploited” (Eccles, 1950, p. 97).  In other words, 
replenishment at sea (“mobile fleet support”) is a key enabler of many of the significant 
advantages that sea power affords, and as such plays a critical role in naval logistics 
strategy.  As a crucial part of something that is well and long understood to be an 
important component of successful military campaigns, it is only right to ask “but can we 
support it at sea?”  
The NNFM study leaves this as an open question.  While acknowledging that a 
potential shortfall may exist, the current plan for 30 CLF ships is left unchanged with the 
provision that CLF force structure be “subjected to continuing review” as the “new 
fighting machine is constructed and deployed” (Hughes, 2009, p. 44).  Given its focus on 
capabilities and archetypes over highly detailed platform specifications, this was a 
reasonable decision.  Given the importance of supportability to successful operations, 
however, we feel it is never too early to begin thinking about questions of logistics now 
that the concepts and archetypes have been established. 
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Here are some clues that anticipate our conclusions.  The last time the U.S. fleet 
approached the size of the proposed NNFM fleet in terms of number of ships was the 
594-ship navy of 1987 (Naval Historical Center, 2011).  At that time, estimates of the 
number of CLF ships required to support the fleet ranged from 65 to as many as 93 
(CBO, 1988).  At 677 ships, the NNFM features almost 15% more ships than the 1987 
fleet of 594, and presently proposes to support it with only 30 CLF ships—at best half the 
number deemed necessary to support the smaller 1987 fleet.  Clearly, supporting 15% 
more combatants with (at best) half of the number of CLF ships is a herculean task.  
While there have been advances in replenishment ship design over the past 25 years, the 
physical process of transferring materiel between ships at sea itself remains essentially 
unchanged and it is doubtful that the efficiencies gained to date are capable of covering 
such a massive shortfall.   
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II. METHODOLGY AND SCENARIO DESCRIPTION 
A. METHODOLOGY 
The primary goal of this research is to provide an initial assessment of the ability 
of the current CLF to support a fleet of more numerous but smaller combatant ships like 
the one proposed in the NNFM study.  As a secondary goal, we also seek to exercise the 
CLF Planner to demonstrate its flexibility for both force and campaign planning in a wide 
variety of circumstances.  While other work has focused on adapting the underlying CLF 
Planner model to perform operational planning (Hallman, 2009), it is important to not 
lose sight of its origins as a strategic programmatic planning aid.  With the CLF facing a 
pressing need to do more with less, Brown and Carlyle (2008, p. 800) set out to find a 
better way to “determine whether or not, and how, the new CLF can actually support its 
anticipated missions.”  Here, the problem has been inverted:  instead of considering the 
impact of a changing CLF on the existing fleet, we are now concerned with the impact of 
a changing fleet on an existing CLF.  We demonstrate that the CLF Planner is an 
excellent tool for performing such analysis. 
To accomplish this, task groups of varying composition are run through a fixed 
employment scenario using the CLF Planner.  Specifically, we first establish a baseline 
for performance by a force composed entirely of traditional (current) units.  We then 
explore three variations to examine the impact of replacing various components of this 
traditional force with replacement platforms proposed by the NNFM.  Day-by-day data 
are collected on task group inventory levels for each of the commodities tracked by the 
CLF Planner as well as CLF ship employment schedules.  These data are then analyzed to 
roughly quantify any potential differences in support requirements and shortfalls in 
mission capacity that can be attributed to logistics.  The source of our data for this 
analysis will be the daily battle group state (BG state) and CLF schedule worksheets 
generated by CLF Planner for each phase of the scenario.  
A CLF schedule worksheet presents face-valid employment schedules for each of 
the CLF ships available that minimize customer shortfalls within the planning horizon 
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(Brown & Carlyle, 2008, p. 800).  A sample of the output generated is shown as Figure 1.  
For every day in the planning horizon, each CLF ship is assigned to one of several 
possible employment states reflecting whether the ship in question is transiting to or from 
a given location (“inbound,” “outbound,” or “direct”), giving or receiving stores 
(“loading” and “consol”), or idle. While both the time available and the amount of each 
commodity held by the CLF ship in question are factors in whether or not a consolidation 
event can take place, time can always be traded for increased stores by returning to port 
for replenishment.  Stores, however, cannot be easily traded for time.  As such, we choose 
to use time spent in idle status as a proxy for the latent support capacity that each CLF 
ship holds over the planning horizon in question.  To do so, we calculate a normalized 
idle rate for each CLF ship by dividing the number of days spent in “idle” status by the 
number of days in the planning horizon at hand.  Although there are too many 
complicating factors to map this number directly to a amount of specific stores that could 
be delivered, insight can still be gained by using it comparatively. 
 
 
Figure 1.   Sample CLF planner schedule.  On the left is the control panel used to 
access the reports and data entry pages. Shuttle schedule information is in 
the table on the right.  Each line in the table describes the activity of one 
specific shuttle on one specific day of the scenario.  Entries within each line 
include (from left to right) employment status of the shuttle for that day, 
shuttle identification label, scenario day, geographic location, client ship 
serviced that day (if any), quantity of commodities available for transfer at 
the end of day, and quantity of commodities transferred that day (if any).   
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The BG state worksheet provides a day-by-day accounting of the projected 
percentage of capacity held by each task group for each of the four commodity groups 
tracked by CLF Planner given the specified operational tasking of that task group and the 
generated replenishment schedule.  An example of this report is shown as Figure 2.  From 
this data, we construct additional data points representing what portion of the planning 
horizon each task group spends below the danger (50%) and extremis (25%) inventory 
thresholds.  These serve as our proxy for mission capability.  A ship in a danger status 
may be able to complete assigned tasking, but will lack flexibility compared to a ship 
with ample stores when reality inevitably begins to diverge from our simplified model.  
Ships that reach extremis levels would be unable to prosecute mission tasking at all, 
being forced instead to actively pursue replenishment before becoming a casualty.  As 
with CLF idle rates, these metrics are intended to be used comparatively.  So long as on-
hand balances remain strictly positive, higher danger and idle rates do not necessarily 
mean that a task group will fail to perform its assigned tasks.  Instead, we consider only 
that when comparing two task groups the group with lower danger and idle rates would 




Figure 2.   Sample BG state report.  On the left is the control panel used to access the 
reports and data entry pages. Daily task group state information is in the 
table on the right.  Each line represents the state of the specified task group 
on the specified day.  Entries within each line include (from left to right) the 
task group label, scenario day, geographic coordinates, end of day on-hand 
commodity balances as a percentage of capacity, in indicator of type of 
replenishment conducted (if any), the shuttle providing commodities (if 
any), and the amount (in abstract c-units) of each commodity received that 
day, if any. 
B. SCENARIO DESCRIPTION 
The scenario employed focuses on two carrier strike groups (CSG), denoted as 
SDCA_CSG and MED_CSG based on their starting positions, involved in a major 
conflict in the South China Sea.  Although an actual major theater conflict would be 
conducted with far more than this, two CSG are key components to conduct the sustained 
high-tempo round-the-clock flight operations required and represent a sensible building 
block with which to start.  The scenario is 100 days in total length and consists of three 
phases that cover a wide range of operational employment tempos. Although the conflict 
is set in the South China Sea for modeling purposes, the geography involved is easily 
generalized.  The key characteristics are two CSGs within 800 nm of each other with at 




Figure 3.   Scenario geography.  The star indicates the position of the forward logistics 
hub in Singapore.  The two triangles represent the centers of the two task 
group operating areas.   The shaded circle indicates a 1000nm radius from 
Singapore.  Map from the CIA World Fact Book (CIA, 2012). 
The scenario is broken into three phases.  Timelines and tasking for each phase 
are derived from a series of unpublished analyses conducted as part of a resident Joint 
Campaign Analysis course at the Naval Postgraduate School.  As part of this course, the 
broad question of how to conduct an opposed amphibious landing in the South China Sea 
was examined in five domains, with each assigned a team of Operations Research and 
Systems Engineering students to perform analysis of the requirements and likely 
outcomes of the conflict within their domains.  Two of these are directly pertinent to the 
development of the scenario explored here.  Alexander, Dozier, and Nevo (2011) explore 
the needs and timelines of a successful air superiority campaign.  Chiam, Geiser, and 
Jensen (2011) consider the requirements for a successful maritime superiority and anti-
submarine warfare campaign. 
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Previous work produced in this forum on the Falkland Islands and Desert Storm 
conflicts was found to be similar enough to the events as they eventually unfolded to be 
highly useful for planning.  Therefore, we feel comfortable that the scenario is at least a 
reasonable approximation of the requirements of an actual conflict for a rough order of 
magnitude analysis such as this. 
Each phase of the scenario is modeled independently to facilitate tailoring the 
support assets available to the demands of the operation.  This cascading solves approach 
has the added benefit of reducing the size, and therefore solve time, of the resulting 
mixed integer program (MIP).  To manage the transitions between phases, task group 
inventory state at the end of each planning window is carried forward to become the 
starting state for the next phase.  CLF ships that end a phase in an idle state at less than 
full capacity are manually repositioned to the closest replenishment point and become 
available fully loaded in the next phase after an appropriate delay to account for transit 
and reloading times.  CLF Planner is allowed to optimally position those CLF ships that 
end the previous phase idle and loaded, and those CLF ships that end a phase with a 
consolidation event are left as they were at the end of the phase. 
The first phase modeled is the “Transit” one, where the two task groups transit 
from their starting positions to the assigned operating area.  This phase spans 17 days, 
with both task groups assigned to the “InTransit” employment category within CLF 
Planner throughout.  This requires moderate DFM and JP5 usage but very low ordnance 
consumption and exemplifies the demands of high-speed transit with limited resupply 
opportunities due to the high speed of advance required of the task groups. 
The second (“Assault”) phase consists of 38 days of high intensity combat 
operations with both task groups assigned to the “Assault” employment category 
throughout, driving high levels of demand for all commodities.  This phase models the 
major combat operations required to achieve air and maritime superiority within the 
region.  In reality, the strain of conducting 38 consecutive days of maximum-tempo flight 
operations may prove too much for the warships and their crews to handle and actual 
consumption might be somewhat less.  Deriving an appropriate ratio of maximum effort 
 13 
to recovery days, however, is beyond the scope of this research and as such, we err on the 
side of caution and assume the maximal level of demand for the entire 38-day period. 
The final (“Sustain”) phase of the operation lasts 45 days.  During this phase, task 
groups are assigned within CLF Planner to 21 days of “Sustain” operations followed by 
24 days of “OnStation.”  This combination drives moderately high levels of demand for 
fuel but substantially less ordnance requirements.  It is intended to represent the level of 
effort required to maintain air and maritime superiority that has already been established.  
In more general application, this would be similar to the level of effort required by a low-
to-mid-intensity conflict within an AOR in which U.S. superiority was not directly 
challenged. 
With the scenario laid out into manageable pieces, one additional challenge needs 
to be addressed.  As events in both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans during the second 
World War have shown, the long supply lines required to support a major overseas war 
present an attractive target to a capable naval adversary.  To counter this threat, we must 
consider the need to protect our CLF ships.  Barring significant “hardening” of U.S. CLF 
ships, this will require the assignment of additional combatants in an escort role.  Because 
CLF Planner generates CLF voyage plans in response to the fixed combatant voyage 
plans provided at run time we cannot simply assign surface combatants to escort each 
CLF ship.  Still, we point out that the additional logistical demand posed by the escort 
ships could prove significant and must be accounted for.  For modeling purposes, our 
solution to this problem is to decrease the capacities of each CLF unit by an amount equal 
to 14 days consumption by a DDG operating in an “InTransit” status.  In running the 
model throughout the course of the research, this 14 days proved to be a very 
conservative upper bound for the amount of time a CLF ship might spend between port 
calls, validating this figure as a reasonable safety buffer. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The application of the techniques of optimization to the problems of naval 
logistics is far from new, dating back to at least the 1950s (see references of Brown & 
Carlyle, 2008).  CLF Planner, the underlying model used in our analysis, is itself the 
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product of a long series of NPS theses.  Borden (2001) laid the foundation for much of 
what was to become CLF Planner in his exploration of the (at the time) proposed T-AKE 
platform.  Givens (2002) introduces the ability to restrict shuttle access to ports, 
significantly improving solve times for theater-based (vice worldwide) scenarios.  Lastly, 
Doyle (2006) consolidated the incremental improvements proposed by Cardillo (2004) 
and DeGrange (2005), as well as adding provisions for numbered fleet ownership of CLF 
assets. 
This research differentiates itself from these past efforts in its attempt to move 
beyond calculating the minimum number of CLF ships required to support a particular 
fleet under a particular set of business rules into quantifying (however roughly) what that 
minimum level of support actually “buys” in terms of potential mission flexibility and 
unused support capacity.  It is our hope that these insights will encourage future 
combatant and support fleets to be developed synchronously, to the benefit of both. 
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III. INTRODUCTION TO THE COMBAT LOGISTICS FORCE 
(CLF) PLANNER 
A. DESCRIPTION AND HISTORY 
The CLF Planner, canonically described by Brown and Carlyle (2008), is an 
integer linear optimization model that seeks to maximize the distribution of multiple 
commodities to clients (combatant ships) by providers (replenishment ships).  Moving 
beyond a simple tanker-scheduling problem, it considers both geographic constraints and 
the escalating impact of allowing client commodity levels to fall too low.  Because 
potential commodity transfers are constrained by the geography of the scenario—time, 
distance, and navigability of intermediary sea routes are all considered—it does not 
overestimate the efficiency of the CLF as many steady-state analyses do (DeGrange, 
2005).  Because it uses an optimization model, the analyst can rest assured that the 
solutions returned accurately represent the very best level of support that can be achieved 
within the scenario as described.  Additionally, all significant model parameters are user 
adjustable, with input and output coordinated via an Excel (Microsoft, 2007) spreadsheet 
front end.  These three traits make it an attractive and powerful tool for performing 
analysis such as that undertaken here. 
Within CLF Planner, the commodities typically replenished at sea are categorized 
into four groups:  marine diesel fuel (DFM); aviation fuel (JP5); stores (STORES), which 
includes both foodstuffs and general supplies; and ordnance (ORDN).  Within the model, 
specific units of measure are abstracted away by the use of a generalized unit of measure 
called a “c-unit.”  For reference, the capacities and consumption rates within the model 
are based on the logistics planning factors found in NWP 4.01-2 (CNO NWP 4-01.2, 
2007), and translate as barrels (42 U.S. gallons) for DFM and JP5 and short tons (2,000 
pounds) for STORES and ORDN. 
Client (combatant) ships are defined by class—e.g., destroyer (DDG), cruiser 
(CG), or frigate (FFG).  For every commodity group in the model, each ship class has a 
capacity and a set of daily consumption rates based on the operational employment of the 
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client.  Operational employment categories can be user-defined, with a robust set based 
on NWP 4.01-2 built into the model by default. 
Combatant ships are organized into task groups for voyage planning purposes.    
Brown and Carlyle (2008) refer to any such set of combatant ships as a “battle group” 
(BG).  Since the phrase “battle group” carries connotations of a particular force structure, 
we choose to adopt the more general “task group” in its place, but the two terms are 
intended to be used interchangeably.  The voyage plan specifies a geographic position 
and operational employment category for the task group on each day in the planning 
horizon under consideration. 
Replenishment (CLF) ships, or shuttles, are defined by a separate set of 
parameters that include their top sustained speed and capacities for each commodity 
group.  Definitions are included for each class of replenishment ship currently in the U.S. 
inventory, including several potential configurations for the multi-commodity T-AKE.  A 
handful of Canadian and United Kingdom oilers are included as well.  If further 
flexibility is desired, the planner may specify additional classes of either combatant or 
replenishment ships. 
Solutions are generated in two steps.  First, feasible shuttle tracks are created by 
overlaying the specified task group voyage plans on top of an internal global sea routes 
network (illustrated in Figure 4).  Nodes are added at each intersection between voyage 
plan and sea route network arc to enable shuttles to transit along combatant voyage plan 
tracks as needed.  The resulting composite network is used to generate the minimum 
travel time (in days) between all pairs of nodes for each shuttle.  These travel times are 
then used to generate a data set describing the time required for each shuttle to meet task 
group x on day dx, return to port, then meet task group y on day dy.  This second data set 
allows the second phase of the solution to quickly discard shuttle employment schedules 
that are geographically infeasible. 
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Figure 4.   Illustration of global sea routes network.   
(From DeGrange, 2005) 
The second phase of solution is the actual mixed integer program (MIP) itself.  
The objective of this program is to maximize shuttle throughput by choosing the set of 
replenishment events that moves the most materiel from shuttles to combatants.  The total 
volume delivered for each commodity group is rewarded on a per-unit-delivered basis.  
Each commodity group is individually weighted, and weights can be adjusted to allow for 
differences in the scale of c-units and to influence model behavior—to prioritize the 
delivery of fuel over food, for instance.  To ensure that all task groups are serviced, a 
series of escalating penalties is applied to solutions that allow task groups to fall below 
user-specified “danger” and “extremis” thresholds.  Penalties are assessed on a unit of 
deficiency per day basis, and therefore accumulate quickly.  Penalties are expressed as a 
multiple of the reward received for the delivery of that commodity.  For example, by 
default delivering one unit of DFM is worth one “point” of objective function value, 
while each day of shortage carries a penalty of ten “points” per unit of deficiency for 
violating the danger threshold and 100 “points” per unit of deficiency in violation of the 
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extremis threshold.  To maximize the size of the feasible solution region, negative 
balances are permissible but carry an even more prohibitively heavy penalty.  This 
second stage MIP is constrained by both the geographic factors determined in the first 
stage as well as logistical factors such as inventory balances and limits on the number of 
consolidation events that any ship can conduct in a given day. 
The first output of this second stage is the set of replenishment events that deliver 
the maximum amount of commodities while incurring the minimum penalties for 
allowing individual task groups to violate the danger and extremis thresholds.  Because 
scenario geography is included as a constraint for the MIP, this set of events represents a 
face-valid replenishment plan for the scenario as described in the model.  This plan is 
translated into two primary outputs.  The first is a set of voyage plans for each CLF ship.  
These outline the daily position and activity of each CLF ship in much the same way as 
the combatant voyage plans do.  Utilizing both sets of voyage plans, the Excel interface is 
able to generate an animated visualization of the activities of all ships as one moves 
through the planning horizon. 
The second output is a listing of daily commodity states for each task group.  
Using combatant capacities and consumption planning factors, on-hand balances for each 
commodity group are calculated for each task group for every day in the planning 
horizon.  To aid in visualization, the Excel interface is capable of generating a “sawtooth” 
chart showing the on-hand balance for a specified commodity group for any combatant 
unit (or units) of interest.  Figure 5 depicts what a typical sawtooth chart might look like.   
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Figure 5.   Sample sawtooth chart.  Here, daily DFM balances are shown for four 
different task groups over the course of 30 days.  Peaks represent completed 
replenishment events and the slope of the line indicates the rate of 
consumption. 
B. FORMULATION 
For completeness, the formulation from Brown and Carlyle (2008) follows.  The 
few refinements we propose were implemented outside of the MIP itself.  A summary of 
the canonical formulation is provided here for reference. 
1. Indices [~ cardinality] 
sÎS   Shuttle ship [~7] 
pÎP  Ports available for loading shuttle ships [~5] 
bgÎBG  Battle group [~2] (aliased as bx,by) 
d ÎD   Day [~100] (aliased as dx, dy, dh) 
cÎC   Commodity group (DFM, JP5, STOR, ORDN) [~4] 
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cˆÍC   Dry commodity subject to load fraction restrictions (STOR,  
   ORDN) 
2. Provided Data [units] 
spdSHUTTLEs  Speed of shuttle ship s [nm/day] 
inptTAT   Time to reload shuttle ship in port [days] 
portok4ss,p  Binary indicator that shuttle s can reload at port p 
legdayss,bg,d ,p   Transit time for shuttle s from battle group bg position on 
    day d to port p following established sea routes 
     and/or BG tracks [days] 
useBGbg,d ,c   Consumption of commodity c by bg on day d [c-units] 
mxloadbg,c   Maximum capacity of bg for commodity c [c-units] 
safetyc    Minimum desired fraction of mxloadbg,c  to be held at all 
     times [fraction] 
extremisc   Extreme minimum desired fraction of mxloadbg,c  to be held 
    at all times [fraction] 
hitOKbg,d   Binary indicator that bg can receive stores on day d   
    [binary] 
capacitys,c  Capacity of shuttle s for commodity c [c-units] 
mnfraccˆ,mxfraccˆ  Minimum, maximum fraction of T-AKE dry capacity that 
    must be loaded with dry commodity ĉ [fraction] 
safety_ penaltyc  Penalty per unit of deficit below desired safety stock level 
    for commodity c by any battle group [penalty per c-unit] 
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extremis_ factor  Multiplier (>1, default is 10) for penalty per unit of deficit 
    below desired extremis level for commodity c by any battle 
    group [dimensionless] 
negative_ factor  Multiplier (>extremis_factor, default is 1000) for penalty 
    per unit of deficit below zero for commodity c by any 
    battle group [dimensionless] 
3. Derived Data 
mxconsols,bg,c  Maximum quantity of commodity c [in c-units] that shuttle  
    s can deliver to bg on any given day.  Defined as   
    min mxloadbg,c,capacitys,c{ } . 
mxconsol2s,bg,bx,c  Maximum quantity of commodity c [in c-units] that shuttle  
    s can deliver to task groups bg and bx when conducting two 
    CONSOL events during a single excursion from port.   
    Defined as min{mxloadbg,c +mxloadbx,c,capacitys,c} . 
directdayss,bg,d ,bx,dx  Transit time [days] required for shuttle s to transit from the  
    position of bg on day d directly to the position of bx on day 
    dx without intermediary stops (i.e., visiting port to   
    replenish bunker stores). 
4. Decision Variables 
HITs,bg,d   Binary indicator of shuttle s conducting a CONSOL event  
    with bg on day d. 
HIT2s,bg,d ,bx,dx   Binary indicator of shuttle s conducting a CONSOL event  
    with bg on day d, followed by a second CONSOL event  
    with bx on day dx before returning to port. 
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CONSOLs,bg,d ,c  Amount of commodity c [in c-units] delivered by shuttle s  
    to bg on day d. 
CONSOL12s,bg,d ,bx,dx,c  Amount of commodity c [in c-units] delivered by shuttle 
 CONSOL22s,bg,d ,bx,dx,c  s to bg on day d and bx on day dx (respectively) when  
    conducting multiple CONSOL events before returning to  
    port. 
SHORTAGEbg,d ,c  Amount of deficiency below danger threshold in   
    commodity c [in c-units] for bg at the end of day d. 
EXTREMISbg,d ,c  Amount of deficiency below extremis threshold in   
    commodity c [in c-units] for bg at the end of day d. 
NEGINVbg,d ,c   Magnitude of negative inventory balance in commodity c  
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HITs,bg,d Î{0,1}       "s,bg,d  (8) 
 
HIT2s,bg,d,bx,dx Î{0,1}    "s,g,d,bx,dx  (9) 
 
0 £CONSOLs,bg,d,c £mxconsols,bg,c     "s,bg,d,c (10) 
 
0 £CONSOL12s,bg,d,bx,dx,c £mxconsols,bg,c      "s,bg,d,bx,dx,c (11) 
 
0 £CONSOL22s,bg,d,bx,dx,c £mxconsols,bx,c     "s,bg,d,bx,dx,c  (12) 
 
0 £ SHORTAGEbg,d,c £ (safetyc - extremisc )*mxloadbg,c     "bg,d,c  (13) 
 
0 £ EXTREMISbg,d,c £ extremisc *mxloadbg,c      "bg,d,c  (14) 
 
0 £ NEGINVbg,d,c          "bg,d,c  (15) 
6. Discussion 
The objective function (1) rewards the volume of commodities delivered, then 
assesses escalating penalties for shortages below the safety, extremis and zero stock on 
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hand (negative inventory balances) levels. To encourage maximal delivery volumes, 
deliveries are rewarded at a rate of ten percent of the safety stock level shortage penalty.  
A lower rate (i.e., rewarding deliveries at a rate of one percent) encourages deliveries that 
only avoid shortages, while a higher rate mutes the effect of the shortage penalties.  Note 
that the relative importance of each commodity group within the scenario can be adjusted 
by changing the associated shortage penalty. 
Inequalities (2) limit the total cumulative volumes of commodities delivered to 
each task group to the cumulative usage of that task group through the end of that day.  It 
is assumed that every task group is at capacity in every commodity on the first day.  
Limiting total deliveries to total consumption to date serves to prevent task groups from 
being “overfilled.”  Elastic inequalities (3) compare total volumes received to total 
volumes consumed in each commodity for each task group, assigning shortages (if any) 
to the appropriate category as necessary to achieve balance. 
Inequalities (4) and (5) ensure that commodities can only be transferred between a 
shuttle and task group on days for which a consolidation event has been scheduled.  
Inequalities (4) govern the single consolidation event case, while inequalities (5) govern 
the case where two events are scheduled between shuttle port visits.  Constraint (6) 
ensures that adequate time is available between successive consolidation events for each 
shuttle to return to port and reload.  Constraint (7) limits each shuttle to a maximum of 
one consolidation event per day.  Equations (8)–(15) provide variable domain constraints. 
C. EXTENSIONS TO THE MODEL 
Our first extension to the model makes a provision for the inclusion of an armed 
escort for each of our CLF ships.  Our scenario, discussed in more depth in Chapter II, 
models a wartime engagement.  During such a conflict, it is reasonable to assume that our 
logistics chain might come under attack by a capable enemy and must therefore be 
defended.  Because CLF voyage plans are unknown prior to solution generation, it is not 
possible to simply add combatant units to explicitly escort CLF ships as part of the 
voyage planning process.  Because CLF Planner is such a flexible and robust tool, 
however, we were able to implement a solution to this problem without making changes 
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to the underlying formulation of the model.  Starting with the assumption that escort 
ships would be serviced by their assigned CLF ship on an “as-needed” basis, our solution 
is to model escorts implicitly by reducing the bunker capacity of our CLF forces.  In 
essence, we require each CLF ship to maintain a safety buffer to support its assigned 
escort.  Rather than increasing the complexity of the model by adding additional 
constraints, we achieve the same effect by simply adjusting the model parameters at the 
outset.  
Our second addition to the model addresses the tedious and time-consuming task 
of generating task group voyage plans.  Toward this end, a simple utility was written in 
Java (Oracle Corp., 2012).  This utility requires three simple inputs: the starting and 
ending positions of the desired movement and an average transit speed.  From these 
inputs, it will generate a listing of end-of-day positions that can be used to populate a 
voyage plan within the CLF Planner.  In addition to computing daily travel distances and 
positions in accordance with the principles of great-circle navigation, the tool has the 
added benefit of generating tracks that fall along the existing CLF Planner global sea 
routes network.  By laying our combatant tracks on top of the default CLF tracks, we 
ensure ample opportunities for replenishments to occur.  
The operation of this tool is simple.  First, it locates the closest nodes to the 
specified endpoints on the global sea routes network built into CLF Planner.  Dykstra’s 
algorithm (e.g., Ahuja, Magnanti & Orlin, 1993, p. 108ff) is then used to find the shortest 
path between those nodes.  The starting and ending nodes of this shortest path are then 
replaced with the specified starting and ending positions to prevent backtracking in those 
cases where an endpoint falls in between nodes along the generated path.  The provided 
transit speed is used to compute the total distance the task group can travel in 24 hours, 
and the shortest path is broken into segments of this length the determine end-of-day 
positions.  As the majority of these will fall in between the established nodes of the 
original sea routes network, care is taken to calculate these intermediate positions along a 
proper great-circle arc between the starting and ending nodes.  The results of this utility 
offer a good approximation of a feasible track quickly and with minimal work on the part 
of the planner.  We found it to be quite useful. 
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IV. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
A. ESTABLISHING A BASELINE FOR PERFORMANCE AND SUPPORT 
Before considering the impact of any shift in force composition, we must first 
establish a baseline for comparison.  In this case, we seek to establish the minimum 
feasible support requirements necessary for a traditional force to complete the assigned 
scenario.  “Minimum feasible support requirements” is defined as the smallest set of CLF 
ships needed to maintain strictly positive commodity balances on hand throughout the 
duration of the scenario.  Excursions below the danger and extremis thresholds of 50 and  
25 percent are permissible as combatant units would still be able to execute assigned 
tasking.  Negative balances, however, would translate to unit casualties—literally so, if 
the commodities in question are food or fuel. 
The combatant forces to be supported in our baseline scenario are two CVN-based 
Carrier Strike Groups (CSG), each composed of one traditional Nimitz-class CVN, two 
cruiser class escorts and two destroyer class escorts.  The first CSG (denoted MED_CSG) 
begins the scenario in the Mediterranean Sea, transits the Suez Canal, and takes station at 
N 5.0° E 107.5°, roughly 315 nm away from the replenishment hub.  The second CSG 
(denoted SDCA_CSG) begins the scenario in San Diego, California, and, after a short 
delay to ensure synchronized arrival with MED_CSG, proceeds directly to take station at 
N 5.0° E 120.0°, roughly 1,000 nm away from the replenishment hub.  The daily 
commodity consumption rates by phase for the two CSGs are tabulated for comparison to 






















DFM 2,806 2,806 5,612 2,806 2,806 5,612 2,506 2,506 5,012 
JP5 3,034 3,034 6,068 5,146 5,146 10,292 4,084 4,084 8,168 
STOR 61 61 122 61 61 122 61 61 122 
ORDN 2.75 2.75 5.5 166 166 332 54 54 108 
Table 1.   Baseline scenario daily commodity consumption rates.  Data is grouped in 
columns, first by scenario phase (Transit, Assault, Sustain) then by task unit 
(individual and combined).  Each row contains the daily consumption of 
one commodity group in abstract c-units.  For example: to find the total 
daily demand for ORDN during the Assault phase, one need only find the 
Assault group, then look down the “Total” column to the row labeled 
ORDN, where we see that a combined 332 tons of ORDN is consumed by 
both task groups during every day of the Assault phase. 
Having set a baseline for combatant forces and their associated commodity 
requirements, we turn to establishing the minimum level of CLF support required to 
complete the mission.  Current practice is for a deploying CSG to be assigned either a 
single T-AOE class ship or a T-AO class ship and T-AKE class ship operating in tandem 
for support.  Taking this as an initial starting point, the model was run with three shuttles 
available:  one T-AOE, one T-AO, and one T-AKE.  While, the T-AOE begins the 
scenario in company with MED_CSG and the T-AO and T-AKE begin in company with 
SDCA_CSG, all CLF ships are left free to service either task group.  The results of this 




Figure 6.   Daily commodity levels, baseline combatants with T-AOE, T-AO, T-AKE.  
All commodities represented. 
 
Figure 7.   Daily ORDN levels, baseline combatants with T-AOE, T-AO, T-AKE.  
Same data as in Figure 6, but showing only ORDN for clarity.  At its lowest 
point (day 61), SDCA_CSG achieves a negative balance in ORDN equal to 
20% of its total capacity. 
Figure 6 clearly shows our initial CLF assignments to be inadequate for this 
scenario, with SDCA_CSG spending multiple days with a negative ORDN balance 
during the sustainment (days 56–100) phase.  For additional clarity, Figure 7 shows only 



























































































































































































































































































































ORDN level after day 61 is positive, indicating that our assigned CLF forces may in fact 
be adequate for maintaining operations of that tempo in the long term.  In contrast, the 
overall trend during the assault (days 18–55) phase is sharply negative, suggesting that 
the real shortfall occurs during the assault phase.  If SDCA_CSG were to finish the 
assault phase with an ORDN on-hand balance higher than the 6.2% in the present 
solution, the three assigned CLF ships appear to be adequate for the demands of the 
sustain phase.  To address this, the model was rerun with a dedicated ammunition ship 
(T-AE) added during the assault phase.  The resulting sawtooth diagram is presented as 
Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8.   Daily commodity levels, baseline combatants with T-AOE, T-AO, T-AKE, 
T-AE.  All four commodity groups are represented.  Note that at its lowest 
point (day 40 and again at 77) ORDN now reaches a minimum of 35%; a 
value well above our extremis threshold of 25%. 
As Figure 8 shows, the addition of a single T-AE during only the assault phase is 
sufficient to prevent any task group from suffering a negative balance in any commodity.  
Therefore, our “minimum feasible support requirements” for the baseline scenario is one 
T-AOE, one T-AO, one T-AKE, and one additional T-AE during only the assault phase 
of the campaign.  Given this level of support, the baseline combatant package yields 
danger and extremis rates as shown in Table 2.  These measure the fraction of time that 





























































































































































































25% for any commodity, with lower fractions being better.  Table 3 provides idle rates 
for each CLF ship by phase, representing the fraction of time each unit spends in an idle 
status during each phase.  Because this figure represents “slack” time and thereby 
potential residual support capacity, higher fractions are considered better.  The data 
contained in these tables form the basis to which our variations will be compared. 
 Transit Phase Assault Phase Sustain Phase 
Task Group Danger Rate Extremis 
Rate 
Danger Rate Extremis 
Rate 
Danger Rate Extremis 
Rate 
SDCA_CSG 0.0 0.0 0.211 0.026 0.067 0.0 
MED_CSG 0.471 0.235 0.105 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Average 0.235 0.118 0.158 0.013 0.033 0.0 
Table 2.   Danger and extremis rates, baseline combatants and CLF support.  Figures 
represent the proportion of time the specified task group spends below the 
specified threshold for any commodity group during the listed phase.  E.g., 
during the 17-day Transit phase, the MED_CSG task group spends a total of 
8 days below the 50% danger threshold for one or more commodity groups.  
The resulting danger rate is (8/17), or 0.471. 
 Operational Phase 
Unit Transit Assault Sustain 
MED_AOE 0.0 0.18 0.22 
SDCA_AO 0.0 0.21 0.31 
SDCA_AKE 0.0 0.24 0.40 
TAE_1 n/a 0.37 n/a 
Average 0.0 0.25 0.31 
Table 3.   Baseline scenario CLF ship idle rates by phase.  Figures represent the total 
proportion of time each CLF ship spends idle during each phase.  E.g., 
during the 45-day Sustain phase, unit SDCA_AKE spends a total of 18 
(generally non-contiguous) days in idle status.  The resulting idle rate is 
(18/40), or 0.40. 
B. VARIATION ONE:  ONE CVN PLUS THREE CVL’S WITH 
TRADITIONAL ESCORTS 
The first variation examines the impact of replacing the nuclear carrier at the heart 
of one task group with three smaller, conventionally powered replacements.  Citing the 
considerable procurement costs and vulnerability to attack by comparatively inexpensive 
anti-ship missiles (Hughes, 2009), the NNFM concept calls for replacing three to five of 
the CVNs in the current U.S. fleet with ten smaller CVLs (Hughes, 2009, p. 30).  By 
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distributing carrier air power across a larger number of smaller platforms, both the unit 
cost and loss of operational capability in the event of a casualty are greatly reduced.  
Each CVL will be capable of supporting two squadrons of F-35B aircraft and will be 
approximately 25,000–30,000 tons in displacement.  Since a Nimitz-class CVN supports 
6 squadrons, we use three such CVLs in place of the CVN in order to provide a 
notionally equivalent level of air power. 
In order to utilize this new ship in our model, we must first establish the 
consumption planning factors and capacities to be used.  The first step in doing so is to 
settle on the tonnage and air wing size to be used.  Table 4 provides an overview of 
six CVL-like ships in use by the US and other navies.  The average displacement of these 
six ships is roughly 34,670 tons, and they are capable of supporting an average of 
23.3 aircraft.  Because these numbers are not greatly different than the stated NNFM 
design goals, we adopt them (rounding the aircraft up to 24) to be our notional CVL. 
 
Class Country Displacement Air Wing Size 
Illustrious UK 20,600 24 
Juan Carlos I Spain 27,079 20 
Cavour Italy 27,100 20 
Charles De Gaulle France 42,500 30 
America (LHA-6) USA 44,850 23 
Kuznetsov Russia 45,900 22 
Average  34,671.5 23.3 
Table 4.   Displacement and air wing size of candidate light aircraft carriers.  Data 
from Jane’s Fighting Ships (2011). 
With a notional size established, we turn to estimating consumption rates and 
capacities for the four commodity groups tracked by the CLF Planner.  Because JP5 and 
ORDN consumption for a carrier are driven by the size of the embarked air wing, these 
were assumed to be one third of established CVN levels per CVL.  Because our goal is to 
examine logistic supportability, not combat capability, capacities for these ships were 
also set to one third of those for a CVN in keeping with our assumption that three CVL 
can provide equivalent power projection to one CVN in terms of sortie hours and 
ordnance delivered. 
 33 
STORES consumption is solely a function of crew size.  To determine an 
estimated crew size, we turn to the work done by Juan Carrasco (2009) in analyzing the 
potential manpower requirements of the NNFM.  Using simple linear regression to model 
ship crew size as a function of tonnage for existing carrier platforms, Carrasco 
determined that crew size was well approximated as crew size = 0.0339 * displacement - 
89.405 (Carrasco, 2009, p. 44).  He then modeled air wing manning as a function of the 
number of aircraft assigned, finding air crew size = 44.322 * (aircraft supported) - 
425.07 to provide a reasonable fit (Carrasco, 2009, p. 46).  Applying these two formulae 
to our notional CVL of 34,670 tons and 24 aircraft, we arrive at a total crew size of 
1,721 (1,083 ship’s company + 638 air crew).  Existing STORES planning factors obey a 
rough rule-of-thumb of 1 short ton per 150 crewmembers per day.  With a crew size of 
1,721, this leads to an estimated STORES consumption rate of 11 short tons per day. The 
same existing planning factors suggest that US warships carry sufficient stores to support 
their crews for between 28 (CG) and 35 (DDG) days.  We split the difference and assume 
our new CVL will have 32 days’ STORES endurance. 
A similar approach was taken for DFM consumption, although this proved to be a 
thornier problem.  A simple regression analysis was conducted in two phases.  The first 
phase sought to determine how much fuel is required to provide power for basic “hotel 
services” such as air conditioning, lighting, and water generation that can be assumed to 
remain relatively constant while the ship is underway regardless of its specific operations 
profile.  The second phase fit a relationship between tonnage and the difference between 
existing fuel consumption rates and the hotel services load.  Because logistics planning 
factors for foreign carriers were not available, existing consumption rates for gas turbine 
powered combatants (FFG, DDG, CG) were used instead. 
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Figure 9.   DFM consumption in “AtAnchor” status as a function of ship tonnage.  
Consumption of fuel while at anchor is used as a measure of the amount of 
fuel required to maintain basic “hotel services” such as power and fresh 
water generation. 
Figure 9 depicts the results of the first phase analysis.  The resulting model 
appears to fit well, with an R
2
 value of 0.975.  Applying this formula to our notional CVL 
yields an estimated DFM burn rate of 516.95 barrels per day, a deeply troubling figure 
more than two and one half times the 214.2 barrels per day required by the current Wasp- 
and Tarawa-class amphibious assault ships of similar size to our notional CVL at roughly 
40,000 tons.  Though their reliance on steam turbines for propulsion makes them poor 
choices for inclusion in our regression, it is difficult to believe that such a vast 
discrepancy exists in efficiency between steam and gas turbine based power generation.  
This in turn suggests that there may be economies of scale in play that are not captured 
by our simple model with its limited number of data points, and so we reject the results of 






























Ship Displacement (Tons) 
DFM Consumed at Anchor as a Function of Tonnage 
Observed Consumption 
Predicted Consumption 
y = 0.015 * x - 3.10, R-sqaure 0.975 
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Figure 10.   Marginal DFM consumption by operational category and tonnage.  The 
upper line represents DFM consumption as a function of ship tonnage for 
high tempo (e.g., assault) operations.  The lower line shows DFM 
consumption as a function of ship tonnage for medium tempo (e.g., station-
keeping) operations.  
Figure 10 depicts the results of the second phase of analysis.  Two regressions are 
shown; one for the “OnStation” employment category and one for the “InTransit,” 
“Assault,” and “Sustain” categories, which current planning factors consider to be the 
same from a DFM consumption perspective.  Again, both models fit well—as expected 
with so few data points to consider - with R
2 
values of 0.975.  From these regressions, we 
estimate that the incremental increase in fuel consumption (x) between hotel services and 
actual operations can be expressed by the equation x = 0.045 * tonnage - 9.31 for 
medium tempo station keeping operations and by the equation x = 0.06 * tonnage - 12.31 
for high tempo operations.  Applying these equations to our notional CVL and adding the 
estimated 300 barrels per day for hotel services yields estimated DFM burn rates of 
1,850.8 barrels per day while station keeping and 2,367.8 barrels per day while 
conducting high-tempo operations.   
We once again turn to the Wasp and Tarawa-class amphibious assault ships for a 
sanity check.  These 40,000-ton steam turbine powered ships are similar in both size and 
shape to a small aircraft carrier, though their top speed of approximately 24 knots is 



























Ship Displacement (Tons) 
Marginal DFM Consumption Underway as a Function of 
Tonnage 
Observed Medium Tempo 
Observed High Tempo 
Predicted Medium Tempo 
Predicted High Tempo 
y = 0.045 * x - 9.31, R-sqaure 0.975 
y = 0.06 * tonnage - 12.31, R-square 0.975 
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Ships, 2011).  Assuming a notional top operational speed of 36 knots for our CVL, we 
expect it to consume on the order of (1.5)
3
, or 3.375, times as much fuel as the Wasp and 
Tarawa-class amphibious assault ships require at 24 knots based on the generally 
accepted principle that the power (and therefore to a rough approximation fuel) required 
to move a ship through the water increases with the cube of speed (Comstock, 1944).  
The DFM consumption rate of the two large amphibious assault ships during high-tempo 
operations is 1,072 barrels per day.  Applying the multiplier of 3.375 to account for the 
higher speeds required of the CVL, we would expect a daily DFM consumption rate of 
roughly 3,500 barrels per day if our CVL relied on steam turbines for propulsion.  
Compared to this, our predicted DFM consumption of 2,367.8 barrels per day for a gas 
turbine powered CVL seems a reasonable figure given the higher efficiency of the 
propulsion system used and we therefore adopt it as our planning factor.  As with 
STORES, capacity is set a median value based on days endurance of other U.S. naval 
combatants; in this case, enough to sustain 17 days of sustained transit operations. 
 
















DFM 2,806 9,909 12,715 2,806 9,909 12,715 2,506 8,783 11,289 
JP5 3,034 3,034 6,068 5,146 5,146 10,392 4,084 4,084 8,168 
STOR 61 41 102 61 41 102 61 41 102 
ORDN 2.75 2.75 5.5 166 166 332 54 54 108 
Table 5.   Daily consumption rates, CVN + 3 CVL with traditional escorts variation.  
As with Table 1, data is grouped in columns, first by scenario phase, then 
by task group.  Task group SDCA_CSG now consists of three CVLs with 
two CGs and two DDGs as escorts.  All values are in c-units. Note the 
substantial (7,100 c-unit) increase in DFM consumption that results from 
using three CVLs in place of the CVN in the SDCA_CSG task group. 
Using these planning factors, we arrive at the projected daily commodity 
requirements in the Table 5.  In this variation, SDCA_CSG is now composed of three 
CVLs accompanied by the same two CGs and two DDGs used in the baseline.  The 
largest change is found in DFM required, which was to be expected given the exchange 
of a nuclear-powered carrier for three conventionally powered ones.  CLF Planner was 
then run with these new consumption figures and the baseline CLF support package of 
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one T-AOE, one T-AO, one T-AKE plus an additional T-AE during the Assault phase.  
This produced the sawtooth chart in Figure 11 and danger and extremis rates summarized 
in Table 6. 
 
Figure 11.   Daily commodity balance levels, CVN + 3 CVL with traditional escorts and 
T-AO, T-AKE, T-AOE, and T-AE (assault phase only) for support.  As 
expected, the additional DFM demands of this scenario create significant 
challenges for the CLF–shown here by extended periods of negative DFM 
inventory balance for both task groups. 
 
 Transit Phase Assault Phase Sustain Phase 
Task Group Danger Rate Extremis 
Rate 
Danger Rate Extremis 
Rate 
Danger Rate Extremis 
Rate 
SDCA_CSG 0.0 0.0 0.605 0.263. 1.0 1.0 
















Table 6.   Danger and extremis rates, CVN + 3 CVL with baseline CLF support.  
Fractions represent the proportion of time each task group spends below the 
danger and extremis thresholds for any commodity group.  “Delta from 
baseline” shows the difference in rate as compared to the baseline (2 CVN, 
traditional escort) scenario. 
Figure 11 and Table 6 clearly demonstrate that the baseline CLF assignment of 































































































































































































inadequate to support a CVL-based task group in this scenario. As suspected, the inability 
to provide an adequate amount of DFM drives the shortfalls, with both task groups 
spending significant amounts of time “dead in the water” due to negative DFM balances. 
The CVL-based task group, SDCA_CSG, is particularly hard hit, spending virtually the 
entire Sustain phase with a negative DFM balance. When able to function, our combatant 
ships are sorely lacking in flexibility, spending a majority of the Assault and Sustain 
phases below the danger threshold. Although able to execute their assigned missions in 
this state, any change in tasking that would present a net increase in logistical strain 
would almost certainly make an already unsatisfactory situation even worse. 
Clearly, additional CLF support will be needed to make this variation of the 
scenario viable. Figure 11 shows DFM to be the obvious driver, but the question is how 
much additional support will be required?  Unlike ORDN in the baseline scenario before 
adding the T-AE, here we see a negative trend in overall DFM levels during both the 
assault and sustain phases.  This indicates that both phases will require additional 
support, although the shallow slope of the trend line in the sustain phase suggests that the 
level of additional support required by that phase is modest.  With this in mind, CLF 
Planner was re-run with two additional T-AOs available—making three in total, one per 






Figure 12.   Daily commodity balance levels, CVN + 3 CVL with traditional escorts and 
augmented CLF support.  In addition to the original T-AO, T-AKE, T-AOE, 
and T-AE of the baseline scenario, this variation features an two additional 
T-AOs (three in total) during the assault phase and one additional T-AO 
(two in total) during the sustain phase. 
 Transit Phase Assault Phase Sustain Phase 
Task Group Danger Rate Extremis 
Rate 
Danger Rate Extremis 
Rate 
Danger Rate Extremis 
Rate 
SDCA_CSG 0.0 0.0 0.105 0.0 0.444 0.111 

















Table 7.   Danger and extremis rates by phase, CVN + 3 CVL with traditional escorts 
and augmented CLF support.  Delta from baseline figures suggest mission 
flexibility between this variation and the baseline scenario to be roughly 
equal the assault phase, and slightly degraded during the sustain phase. 
The data in Figure 12 show that this variation now meets our definition of 
minimum feasible support, with no task group achieving a negative balance in any 
commodity group. Moreover, we see from the data in Table 7 that we are, in fact, 
achieving a comparable level of combatant mission flexibility.  The slight difference in 
average danger and extremis rates during the assault phase is the result of only a single 
additional day below threshold by one task group, which for our purposes is equivalent.  










































suggesting some reduced level of flexibility as a result of DFM shortfalls.  The slight 
increase in extremis rate is driven by low ORDN levels early in the sustain phase.  As the 
T-AE assigned to support the assault phase had ample ORDN available to meet this 
demand, this should not be viewed as a serious deficiency.  In practice, the T-AE would 
have been held over into the sustain phase to make this delivery before departing the 
theater.  Because CLF Planner makes the generally reasonable assumption that once an 
ship enters the scenario it will remain throughout the current planning horizon, we 
removed the T-AE order to maximize comparability between sustain phase results.  
 
 Operational Phase 
Unit Transit Assault Sustain 
MED_AOE 0.0 0.26 0.36 
SDCA_AO 0.0 0.21 0.27 
SDCA_AKE 0.0 0.29 0.49 
TAE_1 n/a 0.11 n/a 
TAO_1 n/a 0.42 0.27 
TAO_2 n/a 0.47 n/a 
Average 0.0 0.293 0.348 
Table 8.   CLF idle rates by phase, CVN + 3 CVL with traditional escorts.  Scenario 
phases are grouped in columns, each CLF ship is assigned a row.  Ships that 
are not utilized in a given phase are listed as ‘n/a’.  For example, the 
additional T-AE is only required during the assault phase and therefore 
shows ‘n/a’ under the transit and sustain columns. 
Table 8 summarizes the CLF idle rates associated with this variation.  We note no 
significant increase in excess support capacity during the assault phase even with two 
additional T-AOs (three in total) assigned.  The average proportion of time CLF ships 
spend idle during the assault phase increases by only 0.043, from 0.25 in the baseline 
variation to 0.293.  While this does represent an improvement, it translates to less than 
1.5 additional idle days per month of operations.  This is enough time to perform one 
additional consolidation if the CLF ship in question does not have to sail more than 
twelve hours out of its way to make the rendezvous, provided that the CLF ship in 
question also has sufficient stores on hand to meet that customers’ needs.  While this 
additional time may become significant in aggregate, at the individual unit level it is of 
negligible consequence. 
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The situation in the sustain phase is similar, with the average CLF idle rate 
increasing from 0.31 in the baseline to 0.348.  Despite the additional T-AO assigned, all 
CLF ships remain tasked at near capacity.  From these findings, we conclude that the 
additional logistical load imposed by the transition to smaller, conventional carriers 
cannot be made good out of excess capacity inherent in the current CLF employment 
strategy and that either additional dedicated assets or a new type of oiler will be required.  
A more thorough discussion of these alternatives is found in Chapter V. 
C. VARIATION TWO: TWO CVN WITH NNFM-STYLE ESCORTS 
The next variation to be explored revolves around the new small surface 
combatants proposed by the NNFM study.  Replacing some portion of the current 
inventory of multi-billion dollar multipurpose destroyers and cruisers with smaller, less 
expensive purpose-built surface combatants would enable the Navy to provide the 
increased forward presence the new U.S. maritime strategy requires (Hughes, 2009).  
Further, Hughes argues that from an employment perspective these small ships could be 
mixed and matched to counter a specific threat in a highly efficient way while at the same 
time their significantly reduced cost would lessen the economic risk associated with using 
them for their intended purpose—as warships. Six such classes of small combatants are 
proposed to provide specific capabilities across a range of missions including anti-
submarine warfare, naval gunfire support, deep strike, ship-to-ship combat and counter-
mine operations. 
Designating a specific threat so that the correct package of escorts could be put 
together to defend against it, however, complicates our goal of creating a scenario that is 
easily generalized, and thus some simplification is needed.  The new small combatant 
ship classes proposed by the NNFM are generally of frigate size (approximately 4,000 
tons) and smaller.  At 4,200 tons displacement, the Perry-class FFG is as large as any of 
the proposed new surface combatants and already has commodity consumption rates built 
into CLF Planner.  This offers a convenient upper bound for the demands of the small 
NNFM surface combatants, which we adopt.  For modeling purposes, further distinctions 
are not drawn between the various specific new ship types.  
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DFM 2,806 2,204 5,010 2,806 2,204 5,010 2,506 1,968 4,474 
JP5 3,034 3,043 6,077 5,146 5,170 10,316 4,084 4,104 8,188 
STOR 61 60 121 61 60 121 61 60 121 
ORDN 2.75 2.66 5.41 166 159 325 54 52 106 
Table 9.   Daily commodity requirements, two CVN with NNFM-style escorts 
variation.  Data is grouped in columns by scenario phase then task group.  
Task group SDCA_CSG now consists of one CVN with two DDGs and 
three FFGs as escorts.  
For this variation, SDCA_CSG is composed of one CVN, 2 DDGs, and 3 NNFM 
combatants, represented in the model by FFGs.  Table 9 summarizes the resulting daily 
commodity requirements.  Compared to the baseline statistics in Table 1, we find total 
DFM consumption changed by the largest amount.  The modified SDCA_CSG task 
group now requires approximately 20% less DFM than the unmodified MED_CSG 
group.  This results in a ten percent decrease in overall fuel consumption for the scenario 
as a whole.  Consumption of the other commodities tracked remains essentially 
unchanged, with projected reductions of less than 2.5%.  Accordingly, it is reasonable to 
expect that the projected overall performance will be at worst equivalent to and perhaps 
slightly better than that of the baseline. 
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Figure 13.   Daily commodity balance levels, 2 CVN with NNFM-style escorts 
variation.  The impact of reduced combatant capacities is strongly evident at 
the end of the transit phase (day 18), where DFM levels as a percentage of 
capacity are noticeably lower than in the baseline scenario (Figures 6 and 8) 
despite an overall reduction in consumption rate.  
 Transit Phase Assault Phase Sustain Phase 
Task Group Danger Rate Extremis 
Rate 
Danger Rate Extremis 
Rate 
Danger Rate Extremis 
Rate 
SDCA_CSG 0.0 0.0 0.342 0.105 0.044 0.0 
















Table 10.   Danger and extremis rates by phase, 2 CVN with NNFM-style escorts.  
Fractions represent the proportion of scenario time the specified task group 
spends below the danger and extremis thresholds in any commodity group. 
Figure 13 and Table 10 show the performance of the model once NNFM-style 
escorts are introduced.  As expected, given the reduced consumption rates when 
compared to the baseline scenario, the same CLF assignment of one T-AOE, one T-AO, 
one T-AKE, and one T-AE (during the assault phase only) of the baseline scenario is 
capable of delivering adequate support to complete assigned tasking in this variation.  
The notable increase in the proportion of time spent below the danger and extremis 
thresholds during the assault phase shown in Table 10, however, indicates a lack of 














































We first examine the daily on-hand balances shown in Figure 13 for clues as to 
why this variation fails to offer comparable combatant flexibility when compared to the 
baseline scenario despite having lower overall daily commodity requirements.  The 
height of the peaks in the sawtooth pattern indicates that each task group is generally at 
capacity following each consolidation event, which is a sign of adequate CLF storage 
capacity.  Mobility of the CLF ships does not appear to be an issue, either, with the fine 
pitch of the sawtooth pattern indicating that replenishment events are happening 
frequently.  The CLF idle rate data in Table 11 provides further evidence that our CLF 
ships are not overly taxed in providing this level of service.  During the assault phase, the 
average proportion of time our CLF ships are idle increases from .253 to .303, indicating 
that the CLF workload is actually lighter during this phase as compared to the baseline 
scenario. 
 Operational Phase 
Unit Transit Assault Sustain 
MED_AOE 0.0 0.26 0.13 
SDCA_AO 0.0 0.32 0.07 
SDCA_AKE 0.0 0.21 0.40 
TAE_1 n/a 0.42 n/a 
Average 0.0 0.303 0.20 
Table 11.   CLF idle rates by phase, two CVN with NNFM-style escorts.  Fractions 
represent proportion of time spent idle by the specified CLF ship during the 
listed phase. 
Having evidence of sufficient capacity and mobility, the exact reasons why this 
variation did not perform as well as the baseline are still unclear.  One possible 
explanation is that the smaller ships postulated by the NNFM, while requiring less 
support in terms of c-units consumed, also hold less materiel and likely will require more 
frequent replenishment.  It is also possible that the observed effect is peculiar to this 
specific scenario.  Still, it is safe to say that at a minimum in a wartime scenario such as 
the one examined here, the small reductions in consumption are not enough to 
significantly reduce the amount of logistical support required.   
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D. VARIATION THREE: ONE CVN PLUS THREE CVL WITH NNFM-
STYLE ESCORTS 
The final variation explores the integration of the previous two.  For this 
variation, we replace both the CVN and escorts of SDCA_CSG with NNFM equivalents.  
To account for the lack of flexibility incurred by replacing all of the multi-mission CG 
and DDG escorts with purpose-built NNFM-style platforms, the total number of escorts 
assigned is increased to nine.  As in the two CVN with NNFM-style escorts variation, 
FFG consumption factors are used to model NNFM combatants.  The daily commodity 
requirements of this fleet configuration are shown in Table 12. 
 














DFM 2,806 9,839 12,645 2,806 9,839 12,645 2,506 8,720 11,226 
JP5 3,034 3,076 6,110 5,146 5,306 10,452 4,083 4,189 8,272 
STOR 61 42 103 61 42 103 61 42 103 
ORDN 2.75 2.68 5.43 166 159 325 54 52 106 
Table 12.   Daily commodity requirements, CVN plus three CVL with NNFM-style 
escorts.  Data is grouped in columns by scenario phase then task group.  In 
this variation, task group SDCA_CSG consists of three CVLs with a total of 
nine FFGs as escorts.  
At 12 total ships—three CVLs and nine FFGs—the resulting SDCA_CSG task 
group would be difficult for a single CLF ship to service in one day.  To account for this 
the SDCA_CSG task group was broken up into two groups, forcing two separate 
replenishment events and thus two days of schedule time to completely resupply.  In 
order to ensure consistent measures of comparison with the other variations, the projected 
daily balances output by the model were summed to a single number representing the task 
group as a whole, which was then used to calculate the danger and extremis rates of the 
entire task group.  Conceptually, this is no different from what the CLF Planner already 
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does when computing task group requirements and balances based on the specified 
component ships, and thus the resulting statistics are equally valid.  CLF ships were 
assigned in the same way as the CVN plus three CVL with traditional escorts variation: 
one T-AO, one T-AKE, and one T-AOE are available throughout the entire scenario, with 
one additional T-AE and two additional T-AOs (three in total) available during the 
assault phase and one additional T-AO (two in total) available during the sustain phase.  
Figure 14 and Table 13 provide the summary results of running the model in this 
configuration. 
 
Figure 14.   Daily commodity balances, CVN plus three CVL with NNFM-style escorts.  
Each line shows the daily on-hand balance of one commodity group for one 
task group. 
 Transit Phase Assault Phase Sustain Phase 
Task Group Danger Rate Extremis 
Rate 
Danger Rate Extremis 
Rate 
Danger Rate Extremis 
Rate 
SDCA_CSG 0.0 0.0 0.263 0.079 0.6 0.044 















Table 13.   Danger and extremis rates by phase, CVN plus three CVL with NNFM-
style escorts.  Data is grouped in columns by scenario phase then task 
group.  Fractions represent the proportion of scenario time the specified task 
group spends below the danger (50%) and extremis (25%) thresholds in any 
commodity group.  Delta represents the difference between the average 
value in this variation and that of the baseline scenario.  
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Based on the similar daily commodity requirements outlined in Tables 5 and 12, 
this variation is expected behave similarly to the CVN plus three CVL with traditional 
escorts variation.  Visual comparison of the results in Figures 12 and 14, however, 
reveals that support becomes much more challenging during the sustain phase in this 
variation.  Using the height of the sawtooth peaks as a guide, replenishment events in the 
first variation generally result in the combatant ship being refilled to capacity.  In this 
variation, however, we routinely see only partial replenishments.  Also of note is the clear 
downward trend in DFM for the SDCA_CSG task group at the end of the sustain phase, 
indicating that these operations would not be indefinitely sustainable with the same set of 
CLF ships required for continued support of the CVN plus three CVL variation that 
utilizes traditional escorts despite an overall reduction in daily commodity requirements. 
The proportion of time our combatants spend below the danger and extremis 
thresholds as shown in Table 13 adds further support to the hypothesis offered in the two 
CVN with NNFM-style escorts variation that the smaller capacities of NNFM-style 
escorts outweigh their reduced consumption requirements.  At 0.278, the increase in 
proportion of time spent below the danger threshold is even greater than the increase 
observed in the one CVN plus three CVLs with traditional escorts variation.  This 
suggests that, once again, despite an overall reduction in daily commodity requirements 
the smaller NNFM-style escorts are actually more difficult to support. Despite the 
significant capacity available in terms of both volume of materiel available and area that 
can be covered by the T-AOE and two T-AOs assigned during the sustain phase, the 
additional frequency of replenishment required by the smaller capacities of the NNFM-
style escorts still appears to drive the problem. 
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 Operational Phase 
Unit Transit Assault Sustain 
MED_AOE 0.0 0.45 0.24 
SDCA_AO 0.0 0.21 0.27 
SDCA_AKE 0.0 0.29 0.24 
TAE_1 n/a 0.34 n/a 
TAO_1 n/a 0.39 0.29 
TAO_2 n/a 0.29 n/a 
Average 0.0 0.329 0.261 
Table 14.   CLF idle rates by phase, CVN plus three CVL with NNFM-style escorts.  
Fractions represent the proportion of time that the listed CLF ship spends 
not actively prosecuting a replenishment event during the specified phase. 
The CLF idle rate data in Table 14 supports this finding.  While a slight increase 
in average idle rate is observed during the assault phase, from 0.293 in the CVN plus 
three CVLs with traditional escorts variation to 0.329 here.  Once again, an increase in 
idle rate of this magnitude translates to roughly only one additional idle day per month of 
operations.  We also observe a substantial decrease in idle rate during the sustain phase, 
from 0.348 in the CVN plus three CVLs with traditional escorts variation to 0.261 here, 
equating to roughly 3.5 fewer idle days per month.  Clearly, our CLF ships are far more 
heavily engaged in this variation despite having to keep pace with lower total daily 
demands. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. LOGISTICS SUPPORT MUST BE AN INTEGRAL PART OF ANY 
FUTURE PLAN 
The U.S. Navy FY11 shipbuilding plan calls for a projected inventory of 19 T-AO 





) retains one T-AO and each forward deployed numbered fleet not directly 
involved in a conflict retains two each to support training and continued operations, an 
absolute maximum of 13 T-AO will be available for use in the theater of conflict.  
Working backwards from this limit it is clear that the ability of a fleet such as the one 
proposed by the NNFM study to conduct widespread operations will be substantially 
reduced.  This is particularly true because the lightweight carriers that provide the 
flexibility in the proposed fleet will consume a considerable amount of fuel—unless they 
are nuclear powered, such as the French Charles de Gaulle (Jane’s Fighting Ships, 2011). 
Assuming a roughly fifty-fifty mix of CVN- and CVL-based strike groups, the 
maximum number of deployed strike groups that could be supported by 13 T-AO is six; 
three traditional CVN based (three T-AO) and three based on the three-CVL 
configuration explored here (nine T-AO).  Note, however, that this arrangement leaves 
only a single T-AO to both service any independently operating units and to serve as a 
replacement should a carrier-assigned T-AO be lost.  In practice, it is expected that more 
independent oilers would be required to service units performing such tasks as theater 
ballistic missile defense and maritime interdiction operations.  As a result, additional CLF 
redundancy would be desired and deployable forces would be even further constrained.  
For example, assigning just four T-AO to these functions reduces our number of 
supportable strike groups in theater to four.  Compared to the nine CVN groups that could 
notionally be supported by the same force, that represents more than a 50% reduction in 
combat power unless additional CLF ships are added. 
The results of the variations here that explore the impact of using NNFM-style 
small combatants as escorts are far less conclusive.  While the FFG used as a proxy to 
model the requirements of these small combatants represents a conservative estimate, this 
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still offers a 10% reduction in overall fuel consumption.  Given that this 10% reduction in 
demand produces no appreciable improvement, it seems unlikely that further reducing the 
size of the escorts by any reasonable amount will offset the significant DFM demands 
imposed by CVLs.  Moreover, the results of the two CVN with NNFM-style escorts and 
CVN plus three CVL with NNFM-style escorts variations suggest that reduced storage 
capacities of these smaller combatants will require more frequent replenishments, 
offsetting their lower rates of consumption and making them harder, not easier, to 
support.  In the war-at-sea scenario examined here, we must conclude that in the best case 
a larger number of NNFM-style escorts will be at least as challenging to support as the 
traditional set of CGs and DDGs that they are meant to replace. 
While the quantitative results achieved are subject to wide bands of uncertainty 
due to the admittedly rough nature of the logistics planning factors used, it is abundantly 
clear that substantial additional logistical support will be needed to support the type of 
fleet proposed by the NNFM study.  CLF ships are as subject to time and cost constraints 
as any other ship, and must be designed and built by someone, somewhere.  Given strong 
evidence that the current CLF is not prepared to meet the challenges of supporting the 
smaller, conventionally powered CVLs that make the NNFM-style fleet possible and that 
the transition to smaller, purpose-built escort ships will do little to ease the burden, we 
must conclude that planning for an appropriate CLF must proceed in tandem with any 
further development of a distributed NNFM-style fleet.  We cannot afford (in either 
sense) to wait until the fleet of the future is delivered before we decide how to support it. 
B. THE FUTURE CLF MUST BE MORE NUMEROUS 
If more capability is required, then there are two basic paths to get there: increase 
the amount that can be delivered at each replenishment event (volume) or increase the 
number of replenishment events that can occur (speed).  In an ideal world we could have 
both, but we operate in a constrained environment and tradeoffs must be made.  The ill-
fated T-AOE(X) program is illustrative.  Like the current T-AOE it was intended to 
replace, the T-AOE(X) combined high speed (26+ knots) with a full line of commodities, 
providing a highly mobile “one-stop-shop” for deploying task groups (Burgess, 2004).  
The estimated $1B price tag for this “no compromises” design proved too high, and the 
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program was cancelled in 2005.  In comparison, the T-AO and T-AKE platforms 
currently in use have a cost of approximately $500M (Cooper, 2010).  The data collected 
for this research was inconclusive as to whether volume or speed represents the better 
investment, but as the T-AOE(X) program shows, we cannot afford both.  One must 
come at the expense of the other. 
If we remain attached to current unit costs and therefore CLF ship size, both 
alternatives suffer from the same weakness.  Namely, the potentially catastrophic impact 
of the loss of even a single CLF ship could have on our operational capability.  As an 
example, we point to our baseline scenario.  Without the support of the single T-AE that 
was added during the assault phase, a whole task group is neutralized by lack of 
ordnance.  The impact of the loss of a multi-commodity ship such as a T-AOE would be 
even greater.  A capable foe will recognize this, and CLF ships will become prime targets 
in wartime.  The situation is analogous to that of the CVN as detailed in the NNFM 
study, and we draw a similar conclusion: more numerous and less costly ships are 
preferred.  Just like the NNFM study decision to replace few CVNs with many CVLs, 
having more ships reduces the effects of losing any one.  More ships would also allow for 
a greater variety of CLF ship types, avoiding the size versus speed tradeoffs that killed 
the T-AOE(X) by simply having some of each as needed: smaller faster ships for 
applications which require speed (such as station ships that must keep up with a CSG) 
and larger, slower ships where quantity is most important (such as shuttle ships 
responsible for feeding multiple station ships.) 
C. FLEXIBLE ANALYSIS IS BETTER 
As George Box once said, “all models are wrong, some are useful.”  It is often 
tempting, especially when working with optimization problems, to attempt to build as 
complete a model as possible in an effort to find “the answer.”  Such was the original 
intent of this research.  Although the desire to introduce and (more importantly) remove 
CLF ships in situ drove the shift to the final “phased” and manually aggregated approach, 
we have found several distinct advantages along the way that make it particularly 
attractive for analysis such as this. 
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To better understand these advantages, we must first understand the price we pay 
for them.  By modeling the scenario in phases and manually aggregating the results, we 
accept that our composite solution will likely be “less good” than one that is truly 
globally optimal.  The reasoning behind this assertion is simple; if there were some 
combination of locally optimal solutions that produced a better solution than our 
theoretical global solution in aggregate, that combination of local solutions would 
become the globally optimal one.  Put another way, by its very definition the globally 
optimal solution forms the upper bound on what any aggregated set of local solutions can 
achieve.  There is nowhere to go but down. 
In exchange for this loss of global optimality, or “goodness,” however, we gain 
tremendous flexibility.  In the specific example of this research, that flexibility is the 
ability to adjust the model to respond to the changing needs of each phase by introducing 
and removing CLF ships to meet demand.  Absent this flexibility, we would have been 
forced to provide the same level of support during each phase, potentially masking the 
true challenges posed by each.  As an example, early exploratory runs suggest that the 
meager amount of DFM carried by a T-AE is enough to shift the slightly negative trend 
in DFM levels into a positive one during the Sustain phase of the CVL with traditional 
escort case.  It is only by removing the T-AE that this important potential shortfall 
becomes visible, and it is our phased approach that makes this insight possible. 
Additionally, the assertion that “there is nowhere to go but down” rests on the 
assumption that the aggregate solution is attempting to solve the same problem as the 
global.  By manually decomposing our problem and aggregating our solution, however, 
we gain the flexibility to adjust the parameters of the model in response to the changing 
needs of the scenario.  In CLF Planner, for instance, one could adjust the relative priority 
of each commodity based on the situation, such as by making ordnance more or less 
important depending on the level of combat operations taking place.  We resisted this 
temptation in our analysis in order to ensure maximum comparability between runs, but 
the potential impact is significant and may do a great deal to make up for the loss of 
“goodness” we accept by choosing to pursue an aggregate solution. 
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A second advantage of a manually aggregated solution is increased transparency.  
Regardless of approach, decisions made by the solver will have repercussions that stretch 
throughout the planning horizon.  When solving a model monolithically, the lag between 
these causes and effects can be significant and can lead to observed behaviors that are 
difficult for the analyst and logistician to understand.  By shortening the planning 
horizon, we draw the cause and effect more closely together and more insight can be 
gained into why odd behaviors occur. 
In summary, we recognize that decomposing into a piecewise solution to our 
scenario by modeling it in a series of separate phases will likely result in less than a 
theoretically optimal solution.  However, we feel that any such deficiencies will be 
ameliorated by gains in transparency and the flexibility to adjust model parameters “on 
the fly.”  We are further rewarded by the additional insights that result from shortening 
the chains of cause and effect through shorter planning horizons.  On the whole, we feel 
that these gains outweigh the costs of potentially lost optimality and recommend a similar 
approach be adopted when pursuing future research or operational plans. 
D. FUTURE RESEARCH 
Due to the painstaking, manually intensive nature of developing individual task 
group voyage plans over a broad planning horizon, this research focused on only a single 
scenario with a small number of task groups.  Although adequate for answering the 
qualitative aspect of our question, it is incomplete.  The need for additional CLF support 
is demonstrated, but this set of results is inconclusive for the questions of what 
combination of speed and capacity will best allow the CLF ship of the future to meet this 
additional need.  The potential areas of research listed below are suggested to help add 
clarity to this issue. 
1. Examine the Feasibility of Alternate Support Concepts 
This research uses a “delivery boy” support concept where CLF ships transport 
commodities directly from logistics hubs to customers as it reflects the way 
replenishments at sea are currently scheduled.  However, alternative delivery models 
exist.  One such is the “station ship—shuttle ship” concept of support utilized in the 
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recent past.  Under this model a high-speed multi-commodity ship (the “station ship,” 
traditionally a T-AOE) remains in close proximity to its assigned task group at all times 
to service combatant needs.  Other “shuttle ships” are employed to service the station 
ship and the occasional combatant as needed.  This offers numerous operational 
advantages, many of them outlined by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO, 1988, 
pp. 7–10).  A more-numerous CLF would enable a return to this concept of support, and 
research should therefore be conducted into the best size and product mix for a station 
ship to make this concept desirable again. 
2. Explore a Larger Range of Scenarios 
The scenario examined here was chosen in large part because of the similarity in 
force employment between a traditional fleet and a fleet such as the one proposed by the 
NNFM study.  While this led to an apples-to-apples comparison of support required to 
achieve a given level of combat power projection, it is not a scenario that is the most 
likely in practice.  Moreover, it is only taxing in one dimension.  While requiring a large 
volume of materiel to be delivered, it is not terribly difficult to support in terms of 
distances travelled.  Additional research needs to be done exploring the support 
requirements of smaller units operating independently with greater geographic separation.  
In other words, when our fleet is forced to respond to multiple smaller contingencies  
at more widely separated locations.  These small-scale, widely dispersed scenarios more 
accurately reflect the type of conflicts envisioned by A Cooperative Strategy for 
21
st
 Century Sea Power (SECNAV, 2007) and should be included in any definitive study 
of future CLF requirements. 
3. Examine the Impact of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) 
The LCS represents the Navy’s present answer to the need for smaller, distributed 
warships like the ones proposed by the NNFM study.  At 2,200 and 3,000 tons (Jane’s 
Fighting Ships, 2011), the two competing designs are smaller than an FFG and are similar 




the NNFM single-purpose NNFM combatants, the LCS achieves the flexibility of multi-
purpose designs through the use of interchangeable mission modules (Jane’s Fighting 
Ships, 2011). 
At the time of this writing, logistics planning factors for these new ships have yet 
to be determined.  Moreover, they employ both gas turbines and diesel engines to power 
a water-jet propulsion system (Jane’s Fighting Ships, 2011) that is significantly different 
from the propulsion systems of any present U.S. warship for which we have established 
planning factors.  Lacking any basis on which to build our own meaningful consumption 
estimates, we instead chose to use the well established FFG as the model for our 
hypothetical NNFM combatants. 
The U.S. Navy has already made a commitment to buy at least 20 of these ships 
(Jane’s Fighting Ships, 2011), however, and as a result the LCS will must be a part of any 
future fleet planning over the next 20–30 years.  Accordingly, we feel that incorporating 
this design into our model is an important next step—just as soon as appropriate logistics 
planning factors become available. 
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